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RULE: FARLEY v. GOODE AND FENTON v. DANACEAU
J. R. Zepkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1902 the continuing negligent treatment rule has been ap-
plied to medical malpractice claims to establish when the statute
of limitations begins to run on a particular cause of action. The
rule is typically used in cases where the parties have engaged in a
course of dealing over a period of time and the wrong complained
of has stretched over all or part of this period.
In two recent decisions, Farley v. Goode' and Fenton v.
Danaceau,2 the Virginia Supreme Court applied the continuing
negligent treatment rule to medical malpractice claims. Although
the court professed to be applying pre-existing law in Virginia,
there were no prior decisions in Virginia which had applied the
rule to medical malpractice claims. This article will focus primarily
on these two recent Virginia Supreme Court decisions and the is-
sues raised in the court's application of the continuing treatment
rule.
The earliest decision adopting a continuing negligent treatment
* General District Court Judge, Ninth Judicial District; Lecturer, Marshall-Wythe School
of Law, College of William and Mary;, B.A., College of William and Mary, 1963; J.D., Mar-
shall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, 1965.
1. 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979).
2. 220 Va. 1, 255 S.E.2d 349 (1979).
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rule occurred in Ohio in 1902 in Gillette v. Tucker.3 In Gillette, a
doctor performed abdominal surgery on a patient on November 3,
1897, and forgot to remove a surgical sponge before closing the in-
cision. The patient complained of discomfort after the operation
and the wound continued to discharge pus. She repeatedly com-
plained to the doctor who each time assured her that it was just
taking a long time for the animal tendon used for sutures to dis-
solve. In November, 1898, an argument ensued between the doctor
and patient resulting in the patient's dismissal from the doctor's
office with advice not to come back. She then saw another doctor
who, on April 2, 1899, removed the sponge. The patient then filed
suit on June 27, 1899, against the doctor who had originally per-
formed the operation. The Ohio Supreme Court held that malprac-
tice is a tort arising from the contractual relationship between pa-
tient and physician and that the contractual obligation of the
doctor was to perform the operation satisfactorily, including re-
moval of all sponges. The court found that this obligation contin-
ued so long as the physician-patient relationship existed, and each
day's refusal or failure to remove the sponge constituted a fresh
breach of the contract. The result was that the statute of limita-
tions did not begin to run until the relationship was terminated in
November of 1898.
The continuing negligent treatment rule has developed as one
method4 to give relief from the older and harsher date of the
wrongful act or injury rule as applied in Virginia in the case of
Hawks v. DeHart.5 In Hawks the court held that the statute of
limitations in a personal injury action begins to run on the date
the wrong is done, not the date of discovery.6 In medical malprac-
3. 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902) (court affirmed decision of lower court in a 3-3
decision).
4. Due to the competing interests between protection of a potential defendant from a
state lawsuit and the right of an injured party to assert a claim, several rules have developed
as to when the applicable period of limitation commences to run in medical malpractice
claims. Some jurisdictions use the occurrence of the wrongful act. Others look to when the
injury is suffered. Other jurisdictions look to when the injury is discovered by the patient
and still others look to when the treatment is terminated. For a collection of cases, see
Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961).
5. 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966).
6. Id. at 813, 146 S.E.2d at 189. For a discussion of the harshness of the type of rule
applied in Hawks, see W. PROssaR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 330 (4th ed. 1971).
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tice cases, more than in other types of personal injury cases, apply-
ing the date of the injury rule results in hardship to the patient
because the injured party frequently is unaware of the injury.
Many malpractice injuries are not apparent from an extern-ai-ob-
servation and discomfort is normal following surgery or other
treatment, whether or not malpractice occurred. Further problems
are created by the trust many people place in their doctors and by
the reluctance of patients to challenge a physician's advice or ac-
tions. In many instances, applying the date of the injury rule could
result in the statute of limitations having run before the patient
realizes he has been a victim of malpractice.
The facts in Hawks present a good example of the harsh effects
of the traditional date of the injury rule. In this case, the patient
sued a doctor for injuries suffered as a result of his leaving a surgi-
cal needle in her throat during a goiter operation in 1946. The pa-
tient suffered some discomfort after the operation and claimed to
have told the doctor about it. He assured her that she was doing
fine. The needle was not discovered until 1962. The Virginia Su-
preme Court stated that "[w]e are committed in Virginia to the
rule that in personal injury actions the limitation on the right to
sue begins to run when the wrong is done and not when the plain-
tiff discovers that he has been damaged."' 7 Consequently, the plain-
tiff's right to recover was already barred by the statute of limita-
tions when she brought suit in 1963.
Many states, recognizing the inequity in the Hawks type rule,
now have adopted the time of discovery rule. Under this rule the
statute of limitations in a personal injury case starts running when
the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered
in the exercise of due diligence." In 1977, when title 8.01 of the
Virginia Code was adopted as a revision of former title 8, the final
draft prepared by the Virginia Code Commission included adop-
tion of the time of discovery rule.9 The General Assembly rejected
7. 206 Va. at 813, 146 S.E.2d at 189.
8. For a collection of cases, see Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 387 (1961).
.9. Report of the Virginia Code Commission to the Governor and the General Assembly
of Virginia, H. Doc. No. 14 (1977).
Proposed 8.01-249. When cause of action shall be deemed to accrue in certain per-
sonal actions-the cause of action in the actions herein listed shall be deemed to
accrue as follows:
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the proposed change in favor of retaining the Hawks rule which
was codified at section 8.01-230 of the Virginia Code and provides
that "the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the
date the injury is sustained." 10 The statutory language, when com-
pared with the recent opinion in Farley, raises interesting ques-
tions as to how Virginia courts will deal with medical malpractice
cases in the future.
H. Farley v. Goode
In Farley,11 a patient brought a malpractice action against a
dentist for negligent diagnosis and treatment. The patient filed
suit on November 19, 1976, alleging that "during a course of treat-
ment by defendant, which extended over a period of years and
which ended in August of 1976, defendant 'failed to properly ex-
amine, diagnose, and treat her for a periodontal disease of her
teeth and gums.... 12
The patient alleged a course of treatment and physician-patient
relationship existing from 1966 to August 23, 1976. During this
period the patient saw the dentist numerous times.13 The patient
2. In actions for malpractice against a person who is, or holds himself out to be, a
member of a state-licensed profession when the damage or injury resulting from such
malpractice is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have
been discovered.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. VoL 1977) provides:
In every action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the cause of action shall
be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the
date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person, when the breach of
contract or duty occurs in the case of damage to property and not when the resulting
damage is discovered, except where the relief sought is solely equitable or where
otherwise provided ...
11. 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979).
12. Id. at 971, 252 S.E.2d at 595.
13. The chronology of visits and treatment as claimed by the plaintiff was as follows:
1966 Plaintiff selected defendant as her family dentist.
1966-1969 Plaintiff saw dentist at least 20 times for dental problems and during this
period, defendant cleaned and filled teeth, took x-rays, did crown and
bridge work and capped 16 teeth.
9/69-6/72 Plaintiff did not see dentist professionally.
6/72 Plaintiff saw dentist for either "cleaning and check up" or "cavity."
1973 Plaintiff saw dentist on two occasions complaining of bleeding gums and
because she thought the caps were wearing off.
1/74 X-rays of plaintiff's mouth were taken.
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testified that at no time during any of the visits or treatment did
the dentist mention periodontal disease. When the dentist told her
a tooth would have to be extracted, she became concerned and
went to see another dentist who referred her to a periodontist. The
periodontist discovered that she had "advanced periodontal dis-
ease"14 and testified at trial that the defendant dentist should have
diagnosed it. The periodontist further testified that expensive den-
tal work was now necessary and that as early as 1971 the patient
"had an 'active periodontal disease' which should have been dis-
covered then by a general dentist exercising ordinary care in the
Northern Virginia dental community."15 He also testified that it
was standard practice in that area for a dentist to check for any
periodontal disease when a patient came in for other dental care
such as plaintiff had done. The evidence established that if the
condition had been discovered in 1971, it could have been con-
trolled with a minimum of expense and effort. However, by the
time of discovery, treatment was expensive and more involved.' 6
The trial court, relying on Hawks and Morgan v. Schlanger,17
sustained a plea by the defendant of the statute of limitations,
holding that the disease had existed more than two years prior to
filing suit and that the evidence established a breach of duty by
the defendant prior to that date. Applying the two year personal
injury limitation period, the trial court ruled that time barred the
claim. s
11/74 Plaintiff saw dentist for bleeding of gums.
1975 No visits.
1976 Plaintiff saw dentist because of teeth that were loose and defendant
performed filling work.
8/23/76 Plaintiff last saw defendant professionally.
Id. at 971-72, 252 S.E.2d at 595-96.
14. Id. at 972, 252 S.E.2d at 596.
15. Id. at 973, 252 S.E.2d at 597.
16. Id.
17. 374 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1967). In Morgan, the court considered the question of
whether Virginia would apply the continuing negligent treatment rule (which it concluded
was the fairer rule) and decided, based on Hawks, that given the opportunity Virginia would
not do so. The Virginia Supreme Court had made it very clear that it was not willing to
permit any exception to the rule that, in personal injury actions, limitations on the right to
sue begin to run when the wrong is done and not when the injury is discovered, absent
fraudulent concealment.
18. 219 Va. at 973-74, 252 S.E.2d at 597.
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The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held
that:
[U]nder these facts .. .when malpractice is claimed to have oc-
curred during a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course
of examination and treatment in which a particular illness or condi-
tion should have been diagnosed in the exercise of reasonable care,
the date of injury occurs, the cause of action for that malpractice
accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run when the
improper course of examination, and treatment if any, for the par-
ticular malady terminates.19
The court reasoned that there was a continuing duty on the den-
tist's part to diagnose the periodontal disease, and thus when he
continued to fail to diagnose it, the commencement of the statute
of limitations was postponed: "Here, the duty with reference to an
accurate diagnosis persisted throughout the entire treatment be-
cause upon each diagnosis rested the correctness of any future con-
duct in respect to the periodontal disease. "20
III. Fenton v. Danaceau
Three months after the Farley decision, the Virginia Supreme
Court decided Fenton v. Danaceau.2 '1 In this case, the patient filed
suit on May 14, 1974 against the defendant doctor, an orthopedic
surgeon, alleging that the doctor was "negligent during a period of
diagnosis and treatment which commenced in October of 1971 and
ended on July 24, 1972."' " The doctor had operated on the plaintiff
in October of 1971, performing a fusion of two vertebrae. In May
of 1972, the surgeon again operated on the plaintiff to "refasten"
bone grafts which did not take during the first operation.28
The patient alleged in her motion for judgment that "defendant
failed to use reasonable care or skill: improper diagnosis, failure to
make proper and adequate tests, unnecessary surgery, negligent
performance of surgery, failure to inform her of the risks inherent
19. Id. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at 599 (emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. 220 Va. 1, 255 S.E.2d 349 (1979).
22. Id. at 2, 255 S.E.2d at 349.
23. Id. at 3, 255 S.E.2d at 350.
236 [Vol. 15:231
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in the operative procedures, and 'negligence and malpractice in
subsequent treatment of the Plaintiff.' ",24 The parties stipulated in
the trial court that there was "a single cause of action which arose
out of the operation which occurred on October 19, 1971, and the
subsequent operation and treatment of the plaintiff down to and
through July 24, 1972.' 5
While the trial court sustained a plea of the statute of limita-
tions, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
for a trial on the merits holding that the Farley continuing negli-
gent treatment rule applied. The court found that the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until July 24, 1972, the date "when
the improper course of examination and treatment for the particu-
lar malady terminated. '26
In Fenton, as distinguished from Farley, there was no regular
visitation of the doctor by the patient over a long period of time.
The doctor operated on the patient on two occasions. The patient
claimed both were negligently performed. The course of treatment,
including post-operative care, continued only from October of 1971
until July, 1972, as contrasted with the ten-year course of treat-
ment in Farley.
IV. THE CONTINUING NEGLIGENT TREATMENT RULE
In Farley, the court stated that "[t]his is not the first time we
have recognized a continuing negligence theory resulting in a stat-
ute of limitations commencing to run at the termination of an
undertaking." 28 In support of this statement, the court cited two
24. Id.
25. Id. The opinion gives no hint about the reason for the stipulation in the trial court.
It is not possible to tell from the opinion whether the stipulation affected the outcome.
26. Id. at 4, 255 S.E.2d at 350.
27. The chronology of visits and treatment as claimed by the patient is:
10/71 Patient admitted to hospital where defendant doctor undertook to diagnose
and treat back and neck problems.
10/19/71 Defendant performed surgery on patient involving a fusion of two
vertabrae.
5/14/72 Patient had continued to be seen and treated by doctor after 10/19 surgery.
On this day, doctor performed additional surgery on patient involving the
"refastening" of bone grafts which did not "take" during the first operation.
Id. at 3, 255 S.E.2d at 349-50.
28. 219 Va. at 980, 252 S.E.2d at 601.
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Virginia cases, Wilson v. Miller 9 and McCormick v. Romans &
Gunn30 Both of these cases involved contract claims against attor-
neys for malpractice; neither involved negligence on the part of a
defendant doctor.3 1
In Wilson, plaintiff was moving out of the state and engaged the
defendant, an attorney, to sell all of his real estate and collect all
debts due him. Following this the attorney was to give the plaintiff
an accounting. After several demands, an accounting was finally
furnished by the defendant whereupon a dispute arose, followed by
litigation. The court held that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until termination of the agency relationship, noting
that "[a]s a general rule, when there is an undertaking or agency
which requires a continuation of services, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the termination of the undertaking or
agency."32
In McCormick an attorney misappropriated a client's funds.
After discovery of the problem, the client severed the relationship.
The court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until the relationship was terminated.3
In both Farley and Fenton the continuing relationship existed,
but not because the patient either contracted for or sought it. In-
stead, in each case, the patient contracted for a particular act, e.g.,
a dental exam or a surgical procedure. However, in McCormick
and Wilson the nature of the agreements contemplated perform-
ance over a period of time.
The Virginia Supreme Court distinguished Farley from Caudill
v. Wise Rambler, Inc." and Hawks, both of which had been de-
cided under the longstanding rule in Virginia that the statute of
limitations commenced running on the date of the wrongful act.
29. 104 Va. 446, 51 S.E. 837 (1905).
30. 214 Va. 144, 198 S.E.2d 651 (1973).
31. Accord, Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968); Keaton v. Kolby,
27 Ohio St. 2d 234, 271 N.E.2d 772 (1971). These cases involved malpractice claims against
attorneys. In both New York and Ohio, the continuing treatment rule had already been
adopted in medical malpractice cases and was subsequently applied analogously to legal
malpractice claims.
32. 104 Va. at 448, 51 S.E. at 838.
33. 214 Va. at 148, 198 S.E.2d at 655.
34. 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969).
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The court may have felt compelled to differentiate the cases be-
cause the rule in Hawks had been codified3 5 by the time Farley
was decided, even though the new statute did not apply to this
case.36
In Caudill, the plaintiff filed suit on April 5, 1967, for personal
injuries she received in an auto accident on January 22, 1967. The
plaintiff had been a passenger in an American Motors car which
she had bought on June 2, 1964, from Wise Rambler. She alleged
that although the car was being operated properly by her son, it
suddenly became uncontrollable, veered off the highway and struck
a barricade. She alleged breach of an implied warranty, negligence,
and personal injuries resulting from the accident. The Virginia Su-
preme Court held that as to her personal injury claim, no right of
action accrued until there was a cause of action and that there
could be no cause of action for personal injuries until there was
some personal injury, however slight.37 The personal injury cause
of action accrued on the date of the accident and the statute of
limitations on that claim commenced to run on that date. The
court commented that plaintiff's property damage claim for breach
of contract or negligent manufacture accrued on the date of sale.
Since the plaintiff had suffered some property damage on that
date, the period of limitations began to run on the date of sale.38
In distinguishing Hawks and Caudill from Farley, the court rea-
soned that the cause of action in the former two arose from a "sin-
gle, isolated, noncontinuing wrongful act"3 9 rather than from a
continuous tort as in Farley "in which the negligent failure to di-
agnose properly resulted in omission to perform or recommend
necessary treatment. 40
V. NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR THE Farley RULE
Farley does not state exactly what elements must be present for
35. VA. COD.ANN. § 8.01-230 (RepL VoL 1977).
36. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-1, -256 (RepL VoL 1977).
37. 210 Va. at 13, 168 S.E.2d at 259. "Right of action" is used in the sense of remedy and
"cause of action" refers to when all of the elements of a claim are present. See note 55 infra.
38. 210 Va. at 13, 168 S.E.2d at 259.
39. 219 Va. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at 599.
40. Id.
19811 239
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the continuing negligent treatment rule to apply. The opinion, by
analogizing the dentist-patient relationship to the relationship of
trust and confidence between attorney and client which was a req-
uisite factor in the McCormick case, suggests that the presence of
such a relationship is a significant element. However, the opinion
does not answer the question of whether any trust relationship will
satisfy this requirement. For example, is the rule applicable to the
relationship between the owner of a car and the automobile
mechanic who continues to treat the car for a particular problem
and is negligent in his diagnosis and repair? A negative response
would imply a sense of elitism in applying the rule only to profes-
sional relationships where the professional must be licensed by the
state.
Assuming that the requisite type of trust relationship can be
established, a further requirement is that the injury complained of
have occurred during the course of continuous treatment. The Par-
ley court observed that "continuous treatment" encompasses more
than mere continuity of a general physician-patient relationship.
Rather, it encompasses "diagnosis and treatment 'for the same or
related illnesses or injuries' "41 during which malpractice must
have "occurred during a continuous and substantially uninter-
rupted course of examination and treatment. '42 Additionally, a
break in the treatment for more than the statutory period of limi-
tations does not interrupt the continuity of the course of treat-
ment. The patient in Farley did not see the dentist professionally
from September of 1969 to June of 1972, a period of some thirty-
two months. Yet, she was still able to recover for the dentist's mal-
practice by applying the continuing negligent treatment rule.
VI. CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP v. CONTINUING NEGLIGENCE
Another unanswered question in Farley and Fenton is whether
it is the continuing physician-patient relationship or the continu-
ing course of negligence by the doctor which forestalls the com-
mencement of the running of the statute of limitations. In many
cases, the physician will discover the malpractice early and at-
tempt to remedy his error. The act(s) of negligence will have
41. Id. at 979, 252 S.E.2d at 600.
42. Id. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at 599.
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ended, but the physician-patient relationship continues. This very
situation would have been present in Fenton had the patient not
claimed that the second surgical procedure was also negligently
performed. However, under the actual facts in Farley, both the re-
lationship and the negligent acts were continuing. The court in
Farley arguably deemed each "continuity" sufficient to forestall
the running of the statute.
The court in Farley refers to a "non-continuing wrongful act" 43
as a prerequisite to the application of the Hawks date of the
wrongful act rule. By implication, a continuing wrongful act would
be a prerequisite for the application of the Farley rule. The act,
not the relationship, is the necessary element: "[t]he statute of
limitations commences to run when the improper course of exami-
nation, and treatment if any, for the particular malady termi-
nates." 44 The court in Farley reasoned further than a continuous
tort resulted from the dentist's continuing failure to diagnose
properly.45 If, however, the dentist had suddenly realized his mis-
take and made a correct diagnosis, then the continuous tort would
have ceased and the statute of limitations would have commenced
to run. By extending the court's reasoning, one could conclude that
in order to toll the running of the statute of limitations, the treat-
ment must continue to be negligent, either by a continuing negli-
gent failure to diagnose, as in Farley, or by repeated negligent acts
or omissions related to the same illness or condition, as in Fenton.
However, the court in Farley also implicitly supported the con-
trary conclusion, i.e., that when the continuing relationship, rather
than the continuing tort, forestalled the commencement of the
running of the statute, when it approvingly quoted from Borgia v.
City of New York:4' "[w]e mean diagnosis and treatment 'for the
same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged
acts of malpractice .... ,,f The New York court emphasized that
the cause of action accrued only when the course of treatment,
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).
47. 219 Va. at 979, 252 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting Borgia, 12 N.Y.2d at 157, 187 N.E.2d at
779, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 322) (emphasis added).
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which included the wrongful acts, ended. The Virginia Supeme
Court also alluded to the rationale of the Nebraska case of Wil-
liams v. Elias,48 observing that since "the physician should have all
reasonable time and opportunity to correct mistakes which may be
made at the beginning of a course of treatment,. . . 'the statute of
limitations should begin to run when the treatment ceased.' "4
Both Borgia and Williams held that the statute of limitations was
tolled until the entire course of treatment or relationship ceased.
Whether the court in Farley intended to allow a similarly expan-
sive application of the rule remains an open question.
VII. DISCOVERY OF THE MALPRACTICE BY THE PATIENT DURING
TREATMENT
Another unanswered question- is the effect on the commence-
ment of the running of the statute of limitations of the patient's
discovery of the malpractice while the physician-patient relation-
ship exists. This can occur either by the physician admitting the
mistake or as a result of the patient's own investigation. Under the
Hawks date of the wrongful act rule the date of discovery has no
effect on when the limitation period commences to run. Rather,
the date of the injury will start the clock .5 Apparently under the
Farley continuing negligent treatment rule, the date of discovery
will not affect the application of the rule except insofar as the dis-
covery may cause the relationship to terminate. Under both rules
as set out in the Virginia cases, as well as by section 8.01-230 of the
Virginia Code,5 1 discovery of the injury is not an event that affects
the commencement of the statute of limitations. Other jurisdic-
tions have held that discovery will start the period of limitation
running.52 However, in each of these jurisdictions, the termination
of negligent treatment, not termination of the relationship, is the
event that starts the statute running in cases in which the continu-
ing negligent treatment rule applies.53
48. 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941).
49. 219 Va. at 978, 252 S.E.2d 600 (quoting Williams, 140 Neb. at 663, 1 N.W.2d at 124)
(emphasis added).
50. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
52. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d at 383.
53. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
[Vol. 15:231
CONTINUING NEGLIGENCE RULE
VIII. CONSEQUENCES OF A MISTAKE AS TO THE TYPE OF CASE
When a plaintiff mistakes a Hawks case for a Farley one, the
obvious consequence is that the claim may be barred by the stat-
ute of limitations. If a plaintiff mistakes a Farley case for a Hawks
case and the physician-patient relationship or improper course of
treatment has continued up to the time of filing suit, the claim
may be demurrable because the cause of action has not accrued. In
Caudill, the Virginia Supreme Court held that there must be an
injury before there is a cause of action." The court in Farley held
that no injury occurs until the trust relationship or improper
course of treatment ceases. Thus, in a Farley case no cause of
action would accrue until the injury occurred, which would be at
that point in time when the improper treatment or the relationship
ended. If suit were filed before the injury occurred, the claim
would be demurrable for lack of an existing cause of action.5
This reasoning produces interesting consequences in Farley type
cases. It may discourage a doctor from trying to correct a mistake.
The sooner the relationship is. terminated, the quicker the statute
of limitations will positively begin to run. Thus the patient, in or-
der to be safe, would have to end the relationship so that a cause
of action could accrue and then file suit. On the other hand, if the
doctor believed the case to be a Hawks type, then he would be
encouraged to continue the general physician-patient relationship
and hope the patient did not discover the claim until after the pe-
riod of limitation had run. The patient's safest resort would be to
terminate the relationship and fie suit.
54. 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969).
55. Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946). The court in
Farley uses the language "the cause of action accrues" when it may mean the right of action
accrues. Right of action speaks to the remedy, while cause of action refers to the existence of
all the elements necessary for claimant to make out a case. The court in Farley may well
have meant that when the right to sue accrues, the remedy matures.
If no cause of action exists, no right of action could be present, but if a cause of action
does exist, there may still be no right of action, as where the statute of limitations has run.
See also 31 FOEDHAm L. REV. 842 (1963). In this article on Borgia the author points out
how the court was careful to confine the rule and its language to computing time limitations
while avoiding substantive questions as to when the cause came into being. The Virginia
court did not follow this approach.
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IX. EFFECT ON WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
A wrongful death action cannot be brought in Virginia unless the
deceased had a right of action against the defendant immediately
prior to death.56 If the deceased died from an act of malpractice
and the doctor had continued to negligently treat the patient up to
the point of death, no right of action would have existed prior to
death, and thus no wrongful death action could be brought. Apply-
ing the Farley rule, no cause of action would accrue during the
patient's lifetime since the injury could not occur until the "im-
proper course of examination, and treatment if any, for the partic-
ular malady terminates. ' 57
X. EFFECT OF SECTION 8.01-230 OF THE VIRGINIA CODE ON POST-
OCTOBER 1, 1977 CLAIMS
The Virginia Supreme Court faces the problem of reconciling the
language of section 8.01-230 of the Virginia Code58 with the contin-
uing negligent treatment rule in cases in which the cause of action
accrues subsequent to October 1, 1977." In Farley the cause of ac-
tion accrued prior to October 1, 1977; thus the court was able to
deal only with the existing law embodied in the Hawks rule. The
court may choose to avoid the statutory language by utilizing the
Farley rationale, i.e., the injury does not occur until the relation-
ship or improper course of treatment ends. On the other hand the
court may be reluctant to renege on its statement in Comptroller
of Virginia ex rel Virginia Military Institute v. King0 that the
legislature, rather than the court, should initiate a change in the
law regarding when the statute of limitations commences to run.
Given section 8.01-230 of the Virginia Code, the Farley rationale
could have been limited to the facts, which would have obviated
the need for the problematic language as to when the wrongful act
occurs. The advantage the court realized from including the lan-
guage was eliminating the need to modify or overrule Hawks and
56. VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-50 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
57. 219 Va. at 976, 252 S.E.2d at 599.
58. See note 10 supra.
59. See note 35 supra.
60. 217 Va. 751, 760, 232 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977), quoted in Farley, 219 Va. at 980, 252
S.E.2d at 601.
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Caudell.
Encouraging a patient to permit a negligent physician to at-
tempt to correct his mistake, without the patient running the risk
of the statute of limitations barring his action, is a proper goal for
both legislative and judicial bodies. The Virginia Supreme Court in
trying to deal Farley with a victim of medical malpractice has cre-
ated several unanswered questions to which only time and litiga-
tion will supply the resolution.

